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Abstract. Recent studies show the designs of automated systems are becoming 
increasingly complex to meet the global competitive market. Additionally, 
organizations have focused on policies to achieve people’s safety and health, 
environmental management system, and controlling of risks, based on 
standards. In this context, any industrial system in the event of a fault that is not 
diagnosed and treated correctly could be considered to pose a serious risk to 
people’s health, to the environment and to the industrial equipment. According 
to experts, the concept of Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) is a practical 
solution to these types of issues. They strongly recommend layers for risk 
reduction based on control systems organized hierarchically in order to manage 
risks, preventing or mitigating faults, or to bringing the process to a safe state. 
Additionally, the concept of Risk and Hazard Control can be applied to 
accomplish the required functionalities. It is based on problem solving 
components and considers a cooperative way to find a control solution. In this 
context, the software architecture can be based on a service-oriented 
architecture (SOA) approach. This paper initially proposes a new architecture 
for design of safety control systems for critical systems, based on Safety 
Supervisory Control Architecture, in accordance with standards IEC 61508 and 
IEC 61511. Furthermore, a method is also proposed for design the control layer 
of risk prevention within Safety Supervisory Control Architecture.  
Keywords: Safety Supervisory Control Architecture, Safety Instrumented 
System, Critical Fault diagnosis, Critical Fault Treatment, Service-oriented 
architecture. 
1 Introduction 
Recent studies show that automation is highly influenced by the advance of 
technologies such as mechatronics and Internet, moreover, the design of automated 
systems are becoming increasingly complex to meet the global competitive market. 
Industrial processes must considerer an increasing number of functionalities 
associated with customized products and concepts such as design for manufacturing, 
design for quality, etc. and their control solutions must frequently consider 
contradictory specifications. Additionally, organizations have focused on policies to 
achieve people’s safety and health, environmental management system, and 
258 R. J. Squillante et al. 
controlling of risks, based on standards like Occupational Health and Safety 
Assessment Services – OSHAS 18001[1], and ISO14001[2], respectively. 
In this context, any industrial system in the event of a fault that is not diagnosed and 
treated correctly could be considered to pose a serious risk to people’s health, to the 
environment and to the industrial equipment [3].Thus, several approaches for fault-
tolerant reconfigurable control system have been proposed [4].However, although the 
development of techniques for diagnosis and treatment of faults exists, accidents still 
occur. These issues are fully explained because there is no zero risk in industrial 
processes since: (i) physical devices do not have zero risk of failure; (ii) human 
operators do not have zero risk of error; and (iii) there is no control programs 
developed that can predict all the possibilities. Thus, studies that aim to diagnose and 
treat faults rely on restricting its state space for the control and treatment of a 
particular class of faults. 
According to experts, the concept of Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) is a practical 
solution to these types of issues. They strongly recommend layers for risk reduction 
based on control systems organized hierarchically in order to manage risks, 
preventing or mitigating failures, or bringing the process to a safe state. In this sense, 
some safety standards such as IEC 61508 [5], IEC 61511 [6], among others, guide 
different activities related to a SIS Safety Life Cycle (SLC),such as design, 
installation, operation, maintenance, tests and others [7]. 
The term “risk” defines a metric for quantifying injury, environmental damage and 
economic losses; in reference to both probability of a fault occurrence and magnitude 
of the injury or loss [8]. According to IEC 61508 [5], the term “fault” is defined as an 
abnormal condition that can cause a reduction or loss of the ability of a functional 
unit. In this work, faults are classified into two groups: (a) non-critical faults that 
define risks to be tolerated and therefore automatically recovered by the Basic Process 
Control System (BPCS); and (b) critical faults that define unacceptable magnitude of 
risks and must be either prevented or mitigated in order to avoid a catastrophic 
scenario. The principal is that industrial processes should always be placed into a safe 
state via the degeneration of the processes by layers of risk reduction of SIS. 
One of the challenges is the development of safety control systems, based on SIS. The 
initials basic questions are: (a) how to design safety control systems based on Safety 
Supervisory Control Architecture (SSCA) in accordance with standards IEC 61508 
and IEC 61511; (b) how to design a layer of risk prevention based on control system, 
which will be incorporated in the SSCA, according to standards. Therefore, this paper 
initially proposes the design of safety control systems, based on Safety Supervisory 
Control Architecture (SSCA), as shown in Fig. 1, in accordance with standards IEC 
61508 and IEC 61511. The functions for each layer of both risk prevention and 
mitigation control systems consider safety programmable controllers with their 
respective safety sensors and actuators, safety programs based on analysis, validation 
and verification of mathematical models for diagnosis, treatment and mitigation of 
critical faults and integration of these layers in a cooperative way by a Risk and 
Hazard Supervisory Control using service-oriented architecture (SOA).  
 Fig.1
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independent software-blocks is possible. Therefore, the concept of SSCA can be 
applied considering a cooperative way to find a control solution by using SOA-based 
automation system. Works adopted SOA, in which Web Service (WS) is a popular 
instance of this architecture [11].Finally, SOA architecture approach will be used to 
allow Risk and Hazard Supervisory Control to obtain information from risk 
prevention and mitigation control systems in order to generate a data repository that 
will be used as input for Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms and also for continuous 
improvement of safety control systems [12]. 
3 Fundamental Concepts 
This section introduces fundamental concepts of Bayesian Network (BN) and 
interpreted Petri net (IPN) for critical faults diagnosis. Moreover, it introduces IPN for 
coordination and treatment of critical faults.  
3.1     Bayesian network (BN) 
The BN provides a method to represent partial beliefs under conditions of uncertainty 
[13]. Its graphical structure models relationships of probabilistic dependence of cause-
effect considering a group of variables. Bayesian networks have been extensively 
applied for fault diagnosis [14]. BN allow the combination of human expert 
knowledge of the process under observation and probability theory for building a 
diagnostic structure, based on algorithms, like K2 [15]. 
3.2     Interpreted Petri net (IPN) 
Presented in 1962 by Carl A. Petri, the Petri net (PN) is a powerful tool for modeling, 
analysis and design of DEDS. PN can represent processes with synchronism, 
concurrent, causality, conflict, share resources and normal situations in DEDS. It is 
especially useful in applications in which security is a relevant factor. As mentioned in 
section 1, the proposal of this work is to use PN as a tool for modeling coordination 
and treatment of critical faults in a SSCA design. Interpreted Petri net (IPN) is defined 
as a tool which is associated with either an interpretation or meaning to their places 
and transitions; representing something real which aims to modeling (i.e.: safety 
sensors and safety actuators). 
4 Proposal of risk prevention Control System Layer 
The proposal of a method for modeling and validating control programs is based on 
BN, and IPN. The initial idea was introduced in [16], and is presented in Fig.2. 
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Fig.2. Method for modeling and validating control programs for preventing risks in SSCA 
projects 
 
This method defines four steps: (A) modeling, (B) integration and analysis of models, 
(C) generation of control programs for preventing faults in critical system and (D) 
acceptance tests. The modeling step is divided in the stages: (A1) diagnosis of critical 
fault and (A2) critical fault treatment and coordination. The Step (B) is performed to: 
(i) verify if some PN properties are met and; (ii) validate integrated models in 
compliance with specification. The Step (C) is performed to convert verified models 
into a language recommended by standard IEC 61131-3 [17] and accepted by IEC 
61511 [6] for implementation in a Safety PLC. Finally, Step (D) is performed for 
validating if a control program for each SIF complies with the specifications. 
4.1    Description of the proposed mathematical method 
A1 - Critical Fault Diagnostic modeling 
Step 1 - Drafting table of cause x effect: 
In this step, it is build a table that lists the causes (critical faults) defined for each SIF, 
and effects that are observed by sensors when these critical faults occur. The criteria 
for the building of this table can be: (a) based on domain knowledge about the system 
and / or (b) based on database obtained from either field experiments or historical 
data. 
Step 2 - Construction of models for diagnosis (cause x effect) based on BN 
The cause x effect table obtained is used for building the BN model for diagnosis of 
faults. Additionally, it is strongly recommended to apply some restrictions from 
knowledge to improve the network structured. 
Step 3 - Conversion from BN models to IPN 
In the diagnostic reasoning, causes should be diagnosed based on the monitored 
effects, in other words, the relationship effect x cause must be established. 
Furthermore, these diagnosis models must be converted into IPN to make its possible. 
Finally, IPN model should be transcribed into IEC languages [18] to be implemented 
into a Safety PLC. 
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A2 - Critical Fault Treatment and Coordination modeling 
Step 1 - SIF identification 
From HAZOP studies, SIF and SIL are identified. For each SIF, that represent critical 
fault to prevent, important data are obtained as SIL; that includes initialization events 
(sensors) and actions(actuators) to be performed by SSCA to prevent such critical 
faults. 
Step 2 - Construction of Treatment Model for each SIF  
An IPN model is built based on information obtained from each SIF, as shown in the 
previous step. It ensures that the Safety PLC takes appropriate actions to prevent 
undesirable risks in the critical system. The aim of each SIF is verified based on 
dynamic behavior of IPN models at the end of this step. 
Step 3 - Construction of Coordination models 
A coordination model for each SIF is built based on IPN. Once a critical fault is 
identified by the diagnose model, the coordinator model is responsible for calling their 
respective treatment model to be run, taking actions to prevent risks. These models 
should be designed to be robust against the occurrence of spurious faults that may 
unduly de-energize final elements and produce unwanted system downtimes. 
B – Integration and Analysis of models 
In this step, the models of critical fault diagnosis, treatment, and coordination are 
integrated to compose the SIF general model. The integration is made from logical 
connections, since no flow of tokens should occur among IPN models. After 
integration, SIF general model should be simulated based on computational tools (e.g.: 
HPSim [19]) for validating control programs for each SIF complies with the 
specifications. For the proceeding of simulation of SIF general models, the models of 
devices for sensing and actuation are considered to close the control loop. 
C – Generation of control programs to prevent fault in critical system 
The SIF general model obtained in the previous step should be converted into control 
program based on the IEC 61131-3 [16] language and accepted by IEC 61511 [6] such 
as (a) Ladder Diagram, (b) Function Block Diagram and (c) SFC (Sequential Function 
Chart). Many works have been published about methods for converting PN models 
into algorithms based on IEC 61131-3 languages. An example is showed in [18]. 
D – Acceptance tests 
 
In according with the IEC 61508 / IEC 61511 standards, one of the Safety Life Cycle 
(SLC) steps is related to final testing for commissioning and start-up procedures.  
5    Example of Application 
A natural gas compression station is presented to illustrate the proposed method. To 
evaluate this approach, it is considered one SIF, identified as SIF-01; obtained from 
HAZOP.  
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5.1    Process Description 
The natural gas compression station has at least a natural gas supply line, called 
suction, from a gas pipeline which transports this natural gas. At the station entrance, 
natural gas goes through filters before it being compressed by the turbo-compressor 
machine. A portion of this gas is directed to the utility unit. The utility unit accounts 
for controlling the gas temperature and pressure for use in the compression station, 
such as fuel gas for the turbo-compressor machine, gas heaters, and gas power 
generators. Then it is sent back to the gas pipeline through discharge lines. 
5.2    Application of the proposed method 
A1 - Critical Fault Diagnostic modeling 
Step 1 - Drafting table of cause x effect 
This step was based on the knowledge about the system. The cause x effect table is 
shown in Fig. 3a. All values are binary (e.g.: 0=off, 1=on); except the first column, 
which defines the number of knowledge cases for the specific SIF-01. The second 
column defines the critical fault (e.g.: Very High Pressure on Discharge Header) 
considered for the SIF-01 under study and the remaining columns represent the states 
values from sensors observed when the critical fault occurred. PSHH-006A, PSHH-
006B, and PSHH-006C states are based on thresholds for very high pressure observed 
via sensors installed in the discharge lines in the natural gas compression station. 
 
CASE VERY HIGH PRESSURE 
ON DISCHARGE HEADER 
PSHH-006A PHSS-006B PSHH-
006C 
1 1 0 1 1 
2 1 1 0 1 
3 1 1 1 0 
4 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 
Fig.3. (a) Cause x effect table (b) Resulting BN model for SIF-01 Diagnosis. 
Step 2 - Construction of models for diagnosis (cause x effect) based on BN 
In this work, the learning algorithm K2 (search and score) and also the data from step 
1 were used to obtain the initial structure of BN. Furthermore, some restrictions based 
on human knowledge of relationships between variables were considered. The 
resulting BN model for SIF-01 diagnosis is shown in Fig.3b. 
Step 3 - Conversion from BN models to IPN 
The relationship cause x effect is:  
Fault 1 (PSHH-06A ^ PSHH-06B) ᵥ (PSHH-06A ^ PSHH-06C) ᵥ (PSHH-06B ^ 
PSHH-06C) 
Finally, the model of Fig.4awas constructed including the representation of the 
additional elements necessary to reset the model after no further fault detection and 
also considering the possibility of a failure be spurious(eg.: the possibility of the 
diagnosis do not be effected). The places FAB, FAC and FBC represent transient states 
that may correspond to spurious failures. If the transitions t4 or t5 or t6 are enabled for 
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firing, it means that the signal from sensor is no longer active and therefore, the fault 
diagnosis should be aborted, returning the system to the initial state (place 
READY_D1 marked). BesidesFig.4b describes the interpretations given to the model 
elements. 
 
 
 
Element Description 
Enable Arc associated with 
“PSHH-006A" 
Very High Pressure Deviation in the 
discharge detect by sensor PIT-006A. 
Enable Arc associated with 
“PSHH-006B” 
Very High Pressure Deviation in the 
discharge detect by sensor PIT-006B. 
“Enable Arc associated 
with “PSHH-006C” 
Very High Pressure Deviation in the 
discharge detect by sensor PIT-006C. 
Place “FAB” Auxiliary memory that transition t1 was fired. 
Place “FAC” Auxiliary memory that transition t2 was fired. 
Place “FBC” Auxiliary memory that transition t3 was fired. 
Place “READY_D1” Model is ready to re-start in case of pressure 
deviation in the compression station 
discharge. 
Place “Fault 1” Fault Diagnosis due High Pressure Deviation 
in the compression station discharge. 
Fig.4. (a) SIF-01Diagnosis model based on IPN (b) Description of model Elements 
A2 - Critical Fault Treatment and Coordination modeling 
Step 1 - SIF identification (critical faults to prevent) 
From the risk analysis report in a real situation, 13 SIF’s were obtained [15]. In this 
work, it is only considered SIF-01. 
Step 2 - Construction of Treatment Model for each SIF based on IPN 
In this step, the treatment model should represent the action to be taken by the SSCA 
when the SIF-01 is diagnosed. The action should be close valves XV-001/017/019/020 
(suction line), close valves XV-003 / 018 (discharge header),and send the shutdown 
command for the turbo-compressor. 
Step 3 - Construction of Coordination models based on IPN for each SIF, according to 
[15]. 
B – Integration and Analysis of models  
In this step, the models of critical fault diagnosis, treatment, and coordination were 
integrated to compose the SIF general model of SSCA. After the integration, the 
following activities were accomplished: (a) The SIF general model was simulated 
using HPSim to validate safety requirements for preventing faults and it was also 
verified that the SIF general model is restartable; (b) The properties of liveness and 
safety were verified for SIF general model based on PIPE2[20]. 
C – Generation of control programs to prevent fault in critical system 
The models for fault critical diagnosis, coordination, and treatment were converted 
into a control program based on IEC 61131-3.  The language used in this example of 
application was the Ladder Diagram, although, other languages based on the IEC 
61131-3 and accepted by IEC 61511 such as Function Block Diagram and, SFC 
(Sequential Function Chart) also could be used. 
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D – Acceptance tests 
In the first instance, the control programs were tested on-line in a simulation tool 
based on Siemens PLC technology (e.g.: Simatic S7-300F, where "F" means Fail 
Safe), and then they were validated in compliance with technical requirements.  
6    Conclusions 
In the first, a new architecture for the design of safety control system, based on 
Supervisory Safety Control Architecture (SSCA), was proposed in accordance with 
standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, concerning cooperative and hierarchical layers 
of control prevention and mitigation of critical faults. In the second, a method for 
design the layer of risk prevention control system was presented and validated to an 
application example of a gas compression station, showing to be an efficient method. 
Furthermore, SSCA will use SOA [12] to work with the new Risk and Hazard control 
module responsible for the acquisition and maintenance of data for synthesis needs in 
safety programmable controllers. Finally, some issues must be solved: (a) how to 
design a layer of risk mitigation based on control system that will be incorporated in 
the SSCA; (b) how to proceed the dynamic commissioning to ensure effective tests of 
safety devices in accordance with SIS SLC of IEC 61508. Research is being 
developed to address these issues.  
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